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ROOM FOR TWO IN TOBACCO
CONTROL: LIMITS ON THE
PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE
PROPOSED LEGISLATION GRANTING
FDA OVERSIGHT OF TOBACCO +
CHRISTOPHER N. BANTHIN*
RICHARD A. DAYNARD**

INTRODUCTION

Congress is poised to enable the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
regulate tobacco products, something that neither the FDA nor any other federal
agency has ever been allowed to do in any significant way.1 The fact that the FDA
might soon have such oversight is not surprising. If there were ever an argument in
support of product regulation, tobacco control is it. The handful of companies that
manufacture more than ninety percent of the cigarettes sold in this country were
recently adjudicated as racketeers in a case brought by the United States
Department of Justice.2 In her final opinion issued in August 2006, Federal District
Court Judge Gladys Kessler concluded that these companies, ignoring everything
but the goal of selling as many cigarettes as possible, together designed and
implemented one of the most extensive disinformation campaigns in this country's
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* Christopher N. Banthin is a Program Director with the Public Health Advocacy Institute.
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President of the Public Health Advocacy Institute.
1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1108,
110th Cong. (2007). The House Bill has 222 co-sponsors. Thomas Law Library, Bill Status for H.R.
1108, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:HRO 108:@@@P (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
The Senate Version has 55 co-sponsors. Thomas Law Library, Bill Status for S. 625,
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:SN00625:@@@P (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
2. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2006); SARA
GUARDINO ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY INST., USA v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ET AL.:
ANALYSIS OF JUDGE KESSLER'S FINAL OPINION AND ORDER 1 (2007).
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history aimed at obfuscating the public's knowledge of tobacco-caused diseases.3
This campaign, in the words of Judge Kessler, was carried out "with zeal, with
deception, with a single-minded focus on [the cigarette industry's] financial
success, and without regard for the human tragedy or social costs that success
exacted." 4 Meanwhile, smoking remains the leading preventable cause of death in
this country, killing 438,000 Americans every year. 5 For these reasons, it seems
logical for the FDA to have oversight over tobacco products.
However, peel back some layers and this common sense rationale for FDA
oversight becomes less apparent. The potential for FDA oversight raises some
important questions, such as whether oversight gives the cigarette industry a
government-issued stamp of approval that will legitimize the industry and its
marketing, or whether FDA oversight is the first step towards making at least some
types of tobacco use acceptable. These and other policy questions certainly warrant
discussion, particularly because state public health practitioners have spent years
building and refining highly effective tobacco control policies that will
undoubtedly be affected.
This article discusses one part of the public health community's debate over
the FDA legislation, a part which has particular relevance for the continuation of
state and municipal tobacco control policies: preemption. Preemption has become a
mainstay in the cigarette industry's efforts to secure favorable legal environments
for it and its products. 6 The industry has actively supported partial smoking bans in
state legislatures for years in an attempt to thwart municipalities and local
governments from establishing comprehensive bans. 7 At the federal level, the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) preempts state law
restrictions on tobacco advertising. 8 For example, when Massachusetts passed a law
that would have limited outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising, the industry
successfully argued that FCLAA preempted the state law because it reserved for
direct congressional oversight, to the exclusion of states, all advertising-related
tobacco issues concerned with smoking and health. 9
This time around, the sponsors of the proposed FDA legislation may have
gotten the message. The proposed legislation pays close attention to the issue of

3. PhilipMorris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1, 28.
4. Id. at 28.
5. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,

TARGETING TOBACCO USE 2 (2007) ("Each year, an estimated 438,000 people in the United States die
").
prematurely from smoking or exposure to secondhand smoke ....
6. ROBIN HOBART, AM. MED. ASS'N, PREEMPTION: TAKING THE LOCAL OUT OF TOBACCO

(Elva
Yafiez
ed.,
2003),
CONTROL
4-6
http://www.rwjf.org/newsroom/SLSPreemption2003.pdf.
7. Id. at 4-5.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
9. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532, 550-51 (2001).
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preemption, describing which aspects of FDA legislation are preemptive and which
are not.10 This article reviews this statutory language within the context of existing
tobacco control laws. Part I reviews the general scope of the FDA legislation. Part
II analyzes the preemptive scope of the FDA legislation and how it affects existing
tobacco control efforts. Finally, this article provides some concluding thoughts on
this potential for a new direction in tobacco control.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FDA LEGISLATION
Any description of potential federal oversight of tobacco must start with the
fact that there is currently no scientific evidence-driven public health regulation of
tobacco at the federal level. In his book, A Question of Intent, Former
Commissioner of the FDA, Dr. David Kessler, gives his insider's perspective and
concludes that the tobacco industry's political cache allowed it to insulate its
products from the typical federal oversight that governs other personal consumer
products."' Even within the FDA, as Dr. Kessler and some key allies pushed the
agency to assert jurisdiction over tobacco, there was opposition among his staff
based on the perceived political fallout. 12 Eventually, Dr. Kessler and others
decided to take up this Herculean challenge in the mid-1990s, only to fail years
later when the United States Supreme Court concluded that the FDA lacked
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. 13
Ironically, the lethality of cigarettes provided the justification for the Court's
decision. The Court found that tobacco regulation was inconsistent with the FDA's
enabling legislation since the FDA would be required to conclude that tobacco
products presented "a potential unreasonable risk'of illness or injury" under its
standard market approval process.' 4 Further, the Court concluded that, given the
"FDA's conclusions regarding the health effects of tobacco use, the agency would
have no basis for finding any such reasonable assurance of safety[J" and thus
"could not allow [tobacco products] to be marketed."' 5 However, this outcome was
contradicted, according to the Court, by the existence of federal statutes directly

10. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S.625, 110th Cong. § 917(a) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(a) (2007).
11. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY
INDUSTRY, at xii (2001) (discussing the former Commissioner's revelation that the tobacco industry had

bought the support of prestigious law firms, senators, and foreign prime ministers).
12. Id. at 31-35.
13. Id. at 328-58; Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126

(2000).
14. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 136 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)
(2000), aff'g 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'g 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997)).
15. Id.
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regulating tobacco, which showed that Congress wanted cigarettes to remain on the
market. 16
What, then, is the nature of the congressional actions that precluded (and
continue to preclude) the FDA, or, for that matter, "any [federal] agency from
exercising significant policymaking authority in the area," according to the
Court? 17 The statute the Court largely relied on was FCLAA. 18 FCLAA includes

only three arguably meaningful public health requirements. First, it requires health
warnings on all cigarette packages and advertisements. 19 The public health research
literature supports the use of health warnings, but nearly unanimously concludes
that the health warnings under FCLAA are ineffective. 20 These warnings have not
been updated since 1984 and do not reflect more than two decades of research
findings on the health, addiction, and marketing of cigarettes. 2' The research
literature recommends that the warnings should be larger in size and include a
rotating series of pictorials that graphically depict the health effects to the potential
user and those who will be exposed to the user's secondhand smoke.22
The second of the three public health-related provisions in FCLAA requires
the disclosure of ingredients to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 23 This
provision is also considered ineffective by public health researchers. In general, the
disclosure of product information can be a useful research tool, particularly in light
of recent efforts by the tobacco industry to manufacture and market potentially
reduced exposure cigarettes.24 Reduced harm products seek to decrease an
individual's health risk of smoking by reducing the emission levels of certain
harmful constituents. 2 5 However, FCLAA's disclosure requirement does not

16. Id. at 137-39. The Court noted that 7 U.S.C. § 1331(a) states "[t]he marketing of tobacco
constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities which
directly affect interstate and foreign commerce .... Id. at 137 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 148-56.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2000).
20. Christopher N. Banthin, Potentially Reduced Exposure Cigarettes: The Need for a Public
Health Policy, 8 MINN. J. L. Sd. & TECH. 127, 136 (2007); see also David Hammond et al.,

Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing Smokers About the Risks of Smoking: Findings
from the InternationalTobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL, at iiil9,
iii24 (2006) (suggesting that cigarette labels should include more detailed information about ingredients
in cigarettes to better inform the consumer).
21. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-03 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000)).
22. See Hammond et al., supra note 20, at iii23.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (2000) (requiring cigarette manufacturers to provide a list of cigarette
ingredients to the Secretary, but this information is treated as confidential information or a trade secret).
24. See Banthin, supra note 20, at 143 ("Just as consumers cannot compare prices without being
allowed to check price tags, policy makers cannot develop a meaningful harm reduction policy without
having reasonable access to information about the current level of harm.").
25. Id. at 130-32.
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include brand-specific disclosures and only requires one annual disclosure without
amounts of each ingredient or any brand-specific information. 26 Even if brandspecific information were disclosed, for the consumer, disclosure information may
be relatively ineffective without any accompanying health metric with which to
at least
interpret the disclosure. But, it is important to note that current research,
27
outside the doors of the tobacco industry, does not possess such a metric.
The final heath-related provision of FCLAA is the ban on cigarette
advertising on television and radio, 28 although the marketing of cigarettes at
concerts and other events, in magazines, on the Internet, and around the cash
registers of seemingly every convenience store in this country appear to afford the
industry plenty of opportunities to reach nearly everyone it wants to reach.
Tragically, the audience includes a significant percentage of children.2 9 Indeed,
numerous state law actions have been brought based on the marketing to children
through these venues.30 If the ban on television and radio advertising was meant to
protect children from such marketing, it appears to have failed. 3'
The proposed FDA legislation would supplement these congressionally
mandated requirements and prohibitions with comprehensive regulatory oversight.
Though the FDA's powers and responsibilities would also extend to marketing and
labeling, 32 this article will focus here on two aspects of the proposed legislation that
would affect the design of cigarettes. First, at the heart of the legislation is the
ability to mandate reductions in constituent emissions and other changes in the
product design or testing of cigarettes, thereby theoretically reducing the

26. 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(a); see also Patricia Davidson, Tobacco Ingredients and Smoke Constituent
Reporting and Disclosure Laws: The Case for Expansion, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1999)

(discussing limitations to the current federal and state tobacco product disclosure laws).
27. See Banthin, supra note 20, at 132-33.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (outlawing cigarette advertisements "on any medium of electronic
communications subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission"); United States
v. Bast, F.2d 138, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that FCLAA prohibits cigarette advertising on radio and
television).
29. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,562 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that
the majority of smokers start before the age of eighteen).
30. DENNIS ECKHART, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE TOBACCO MASTER
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF MARKETING RESTRICTIONS 5 (2004), available at

http://www.wmitchell.edu/tobaccolaw/resources/eckhart.pdf.
31. The public health-related efficacy of the ban is further called into question by the fact that it
blocked implementation of the "fairness doctrine," which had forced television stations that ran cigarette
advertising to also air a countervailing perspective and "present a fair number of anti-smoking
messages." Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587-89 (D.D.C 1971) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). After these anti-smoking messages began to air, "[flor the first time in years, the statistics
began to show a sustained trend toward lesser cigarette consumption." Id. at 587.
32. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); H.R.
1108, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
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harmfulness of smoking in general.33 In recent years, cigarette manufacturers have
dramatically increased research and design budgets for their potentially reduced
exposure cigarettes, in hopes of marketing a less risky cigarette. 34 Some
manufacturers have already begun to introduce these products into the
marketplace. 35 The FDA legislation establishes a regulatory framework that could
mandate industry-wide use of a technological advance in cigarette design that
reduces harm to smokers, developed by a particular manufacturer, if the FDA
concludes that the design works. 36 Indeed, recent research at the University of
California, San Francisco suggests that "if the government required tobacco
companies to lower the nicotine levels in cigarettes, more people might be able to
quit and fewer might become addicted in the first place." 37 Mandating a reduction
in nicotine yields would be within the regulatory gamut of the proposed FDA
oversight.
Importantly, officials at the FDA would retain significant discretion in
mandating emissions reduction standards and other design modifications. 38 An
expert committee would be set up to consider all relevant scientific and public
health issues. 39 A representative from the tobacco industry and one from tobacco
leaf farmers would be on the committee, but not be allowed to participate in
committee voting. 40 Any party challenging the proposed reduction standards would
bear the burden of proving "that the proposed [reduction or modification] will not
reduce or eliminate the risk of illness or injury.", 41 In addition, any lawsuit
challenging a mandated reduction or modification would confront the deference
afforded administrative rulemaking established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., and thus deference would likely be granted to the
FDA. 42 Finally, if the tobacco industry were to ask Congress to intervene, an
override would require majorities in both houses.43

33. S. 625, § 907(a)(3), H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(3); accordMatthew L. Myers, Opposition in Search of
a Rationale: The Case for Foodand Drug Administration Regulation, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 441, 442
(2004) (describing the regulatory structure for implementing reduce risk technologies).
34. MARTIN STEINIK & MICHAEL SMITH, THE PATH TO A SAFER CIGARETrE: POTENTIALLY
REDUCED ExPOsuRE PRODUCTS (PREPS) 12-18 (2004) (on file with author).

35. Banthin, supra note 20, at 130-32.
36. S. 625, § 907(a); H.R. 1108, § 907(a).
37. Eric Nagoumey, Lowering Nicotine Levels May Help Cut Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007,
at F6.
38. S.625, § 907(a)(4); H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(4).
39. S.625,§ 918; H.R. 1108,§918.
40. S.625, § 918(b)(1); H.R. 1108, § 918(b)(1).
41. S. 625, § 907(b)(1)(C); H.R. 1108, § 907(b)(1)(C).
42. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (giving agencies the power to formulate policy and promulgate
rules when Congress has implicitly or explicitly left a gap in the enabling act).
43. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) ("Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.").
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The second relevant aspect of the proposed FDA legislation is the use of a
public health, outcome-based standard. 44 The outcome sought in this provision is
not merely reducing the health risk for the individual smoker. Rather, any
reductions are set "with respect to the risks and benefits to the population as a
whole, including users and non-users of the tobacco product[s] . . . ,,4 In other
words, likely changes in quit rates and initiation rates must be considered. For
example, a reduction in harm is counterproductive if it triggers a massive decrease
in quit rates. Indeed, this possible outcome is the primary criticism of harm
reduction public health programs: that the program itself may end up legitimizing
harmful behavior.46 The FDA standard attempts to address this concern by looking,
not only at the likely health risk to the individual users, but also at the aggregate
population effects of smoking prevalence.47
This public health standard would be applied across the board. For tobacco
products already in the market, the FDA would have the discretion to establish a
public health standard,48 which presumably it would do quickly on its own
initiative. Should the FDA not act, anyone may file a petition to initiate rulemaking
and establishment of the standard.49 In addition, the FDA is required to conduct
periodic evaluation of any mandated emissions reduction. 50 As part of the premarket approval process, the proposed legislation sets forth additional requirements
for new reduced-exposure or modified risk products introduced by members of the
tobacco industry. 5 1 More specifically, under the legislation, the FDA may only
approve a modified risk tobacco product application if it determines that the
product will "significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to
individual tobacco users; and benefit the health of the population as a whole .... "52
44. S. 625, § 907; H.R. 1108, § 907.
45. S. 625, § 907(a)(3); H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(3).
46. Amy Fairchild & James Colgrove, Out of the Ashes: The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the
"Safer" Cigarette in the United States, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 192, 192 (2004). The development of
needle exchange programs provides a good case study for understanding the harm reduction/harm
elimination debate. Needle exchange programs, which are intended to reduce the transmittal of diseases,
are criticized based on the assumption that the supply of free needles actually promotes drug use. INST.
OF MED., PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION: THE ROLE OF STERILE NEEDLES AND BLEACH 11 (Jacques
Normand et al. eds., 1995). The harm reduction advocate would respond that reducing the rates of
disease occurrence associated with drug use is an important goal that can be accomplished in
conjunction with other efforts to eliminate the incidence of drug use. Id. app. B, at 311. That some
increase in drug use might occur is outweighed by the total net improvement for public health, according
to the argument.
47. S. 625, § 907(a)(3); H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(3).
48. S. 625, §§ 907(a)(3), (b)(1); H.R. 1108, §§ 907(a)(3), (b)(1).
49. S. 625, § 907(b)(4); H.R. 1108, § 907(b)(4).
50. S. 625, § 907(a)(5); H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(5).
51. These products include "any tobacco product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm
or the risk of tobacco-related disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products." S. 625,
§ 91 l(b)(1); H.R. 1108, § 91 l(b)(1).
52. S. 625, § 911 (g)(1); H.R. 1108, § 91 l(g)(1).
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The proposed legislation sets different requirements for tobacco products that
have not been approved as modified risk products. These provisions require, inter
alia, that the marketing and advertising of these products is carefully monitored to
ensure that the "testing of actual consumer perception shows that, as the applicant
proposes to label and market the product, consumers will not be misled into
believing that the product ''53 presents any reduction in risk, unless, presumably, an
independent scientific advisory committee, which would also be established under
the FDA legislation, concludes that it does. The approval is limited to five years,
after which the approval "may be renewed upon a finding by the [FDA] that the
requirements of [the pre-market approval process] continue to be satisfied based on
' 55
the filing of a new application."
The balance of the proposed legislation would accomplish a litany of tobacco
control objectives. It would improve cigarette health warnings by authorizing the
FDA to increase the required label warning area from thirty percent to fifty percent
of a package's panel, as well as require pictorial warnings, package, and advertising
inserts.56 The legislation codifies the FDA rule limiting sales to minors,57 and
provides $300 million per year in funding for regulation and enforcement from user
fees.58 Also, the legislation grants the FDA the authority to require tobacco product
manufacturers to include a list of toxic smoke constituents, by brand, in cigarette
advertisements. 59 It takes significant steps toward fighting cigarette smuggling,
including American products abroad. 60 It allows the FDA to eliminate self-service
cigarette sales, including vending machines. 61 It eliminates the use of brand
descriptors such as "light" or "low tar," unless the FDA approves an application for
the product under the "Modified Risk Tobacco Products" section of the proposed
53. S. 625, § 91 l(g)(2)(B)(iii); H.R. 1108, § 91 l(g)(2)(B)(iii).
54. S. 625, § 918(g); H.R. 1108, § 918(g).
55. S. 625, § 911(g)(2)(C)(i); H.R. 1108, § 91 l(g)(2)(C)(i). As part of the approval process, the
FDA would require that "any aspect of the label, labeling, and advertising for such product that would
cause the tobacco product to be a modified risk tobacco product ... is limited to an explicit or implicit
representation that such tobacco product or its smoke contains or is free of a substance or contains a
reduced level of a substance, or presents a reduced exposure to a substance in tobacco smoke." S. 625, §
911 (g)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. 1108, § 911 (g)(2)(A)(ii).
56. S. 625, § 202; H.R. 1108, § 202.
57. When the final rule is published by the FDA it must be identical to "part 897 of the regulations
promulgated ... in the August 28, 1996, issue of the Federal Register (61 Fed. Reg., 44615-44618)." S.
625, § 102(a)(2); H.R. 1108, § 102(a)(2). Subpart B of this Federal Register issue mandates a
"Prohibition of Sale and Distribution to Persons Younger Than 18 Years of Age." Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. 44615, 44616 (Aug. 28, 1996).
58. S. 625, § 920(c)(4); H.R. 1108, § 920(c)(4).
59. S. 625, § 206(e)(1); H.R. 1108, § 206(e)(1).
60. S. 625, § 921; H.R. 1108, § 921.
61. Subpart B of this Federal Register issue mandates that a "retailer may sell cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco only in a direct, face-to-face exchange without the assistance or mechanical device
(such as a vending machine)." Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. 44615, 44616 (Aug. 28,
1996).
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legislation.62 The legislation bans candy-flavored cigarettes.63 Also, it allows the
FDA to require manufacturers to make public service announcements about the
dangers of tobacco products. 64
Although a full review is beyond the scope of this article, the proposed
legislation contemplates a level of oversight that is comprehensive and farreaching. Its enactment would be a dramatic departure from the federal
government's current hands-off policy. As for tobacco control at the state level, that
is the focus of the following section.

II. THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED FDA LEGISLATION ON STATE
TOBACCO CONTROL EFFORTS
Where the two tiers of governance in our federalist system overlap, public
health actions usually confront two possible outcomes. The best outcome is a
partnership where the federal and state governments coordinate with one another
and apply their resources in a unified manner to address a public health threat. This
is what we should have seen when Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans, but
what we actually saw was the other possible outcome: a lack of coordination
leading to tragedy.65
Although alarming, the tragedy following Hurricane Katrina is not without
precedent. If we imagine rewinding time back to the early 1950s when United
States public health scientists started to realize the full extent of cigarette-caused
diseases 66 and then play back the last half-century at high speed, we would
experience the same lack of coordination-indeed, actual federal preemption of
state regulation-leading to an even greater tragedy. 67 During this period, millions
of people became addicted to nicotine in cigarettes during childhood, smoked as
adults because they could not quit, and then died prematurely from smoking--in an
all-too-familiar cycle that continues today.68
In its current form, the proposed FDA legislation steers clear of creating
preclusive oversight. Instead, the legislation articulates a very narrow preemptive

62. S. 625, §§ 911 (a), (b)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. 1108, §§ 911 (a), (b)(2)(A)(ii).
63. S. 625, § 907(a)(1); H.R. 1108, § 907(a)(1).
64. S. 625, § 908(a); H.R. 1108, § 908(a).
65. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOv'T AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL

UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109-322, at 15-17 (2d Sess. 2006).
66. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853,

856 (1992).
67. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) ("No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.").
68. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of
Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs-United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 297, 301 (2002), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5l14.pdf.
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scope for itself In this section, we examine this preemptive scope within the
context of three categories. The first category is traditional state tobacco control
measures, which have been implemented in one form or another in nearly every
state. These traditional measures include tobacco taxes or smoking bans, for
example. 69 The second category is tobacco litigation, and the third category is
actual regulation of the product design.
A.

Non-Preemption of TraditionalState Tobacco Control Laws

With respect to the traditional non-litigation tobacco control policies, the
proposed legislation would clearly preserve the current tobacco control policies
used by states and municipalities. 70 Tobacco control laws implement a broad array
of strategies designed to reduce tobacco use. Two of the most effective strategies
have been smoking bans and tobacco taxes. For over thirty years, towns and cities

have been restricting smoking in governmental buildings, restaurants, and other
public places.71 More recently, within the last ten years, this trend has accelerated
to include bars and worksites.72 Smoking restrictions also have become more
comprehensive as a result of mounting scientific evidence that indicates that there
is no safe level of exposure, including exposure to smoke that has drifted outside of
73
designated smoking areas in restaurants and other public places.

Today, twenty-two states and many more cities and towns have enacted

smoke-free laws that include total smoking bans in virtually all public places,
including restaurants and bars. 74 Some states, like Massachusetts, have gone even
further to prohibit smoking in all workplaces.75 Evidence shows that such laws

69. See Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005)
("Although we have long since rejected any suggestion that a state tax... affecting interstate commerce
is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it attaches only to a local or intrastate activity, we
have also made clear that the Constitution neither displaces States' authority to shelter [their] people
from menaces to their health and safety, nor unduly curtail[s] States' power to lay taxes for the support
of state government." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
70. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(1) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(1) (2007).
71. E.g., Melanie S. Pickett et al., Smoke-Free Laws and Secondhand Smoke Exposure in U.S. NonSmoking Adults, 1999-2002, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 302, 302, 304 (2006).
72. See Am. NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUND., STATES, COMMONWEALTHS AND MUNICIPALITIES
WITH 100% SMOKEFREE LAWS IN WORKPLACES, RESTAURANTS, OR BARS (2008), http://www.no-

smoke.org/pdf/100ordlist.pdf (listing cities that have smoking bans enacted in the workplace,
restaurants, and bars).
73. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 705-06 (D.D.C. 2006)
(accepting the scientific conclusion that secondhand smoke causes lung cancer and heart disease).
74. AM. NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 72; Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, SmokeFree Restaurant and Bar Laws (2007), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/phillypoll/SmokeFreeMap.pdf.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2007) ("Smoking shall be
prohibited in workplaces, work spaces, common work areas, classrooms, conference and meeting rooms,
offices elevators, [and] hallways .... ).
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dramatically reduce the public's exposure to secondhand smoke and improve
public health. 76 In addition, comprehensive smoking restrictions de-normalize (and
dissuade) smoking, thereby reducing smoking rates in general. 77
The other leading evidence-based tobacco control strategy employed by states
and municipalities is to raise tobacco taxes. 78 States enforce tobacco taxes to target
the smoker's pocket book, with the hopes that higher cigarette prices will both
motivate smokers to quit and discourage adolescents from taking up the habit.
79
Despite the addictive properties of nicotine, cigarette prices affect smoking rates.
If the cigarette prices rise, smoking rates decrease. 80 A ten percent increase in the
cost of a pack of cigarettes will reduce smoking rates, on average, by three to five
percent for adults, and by seven percent for smokers eighteen years of age and
81
younger.
The proposed FDA legislation clearly would preserve the ability of states to
pursue these and other traditional tobacco control measures. Section 917, which
governs the preservation of state and local authority, states:
Nothing in this chapter, or rules promulgated under this chapter, shall be
construed to limit the authority of a Federal agency (including the
Armed Forces), a State or political subdivision of a State, or the
government of an Indian tribe to enact, adopt, promulgate, and enforce
any law, rule, regulation, or other measure with respect to tobacco
products that is in addition to, or more stringent than, requirements
established under this chapter, including a law, rule, regulation, or other
measure relating to or prohibiting the sale, distribution, possession,

76. James Repace, Respirable Particles and Carcinogens in the Air of Delaware Hospitality
Venues Before and After a Smoking Ban, 46 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 887, 903 (2004)
("Delaware's comprehensive smoking ban has significantly reduced the risk of cancer, heart disease,
stroke, and respiratory disease among workers and patrons in its hospitality industry."); Richard P.
Sargent et al., Reduced Incidence of Admissions for Myocardial Infarction Associated with Public
Smoking Ban: Before and After Study, 328 BMJ 977, 978 (2004) (concluding that during the six months
a smoke-free law was in effect in Helena, Montana, there was a major decline in the number of hospital
admissions for acute myocardial infarction, a condition caused by secondhand smoke).
77. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REDUCING TOBACCO USE:

A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 375

(2000), available at

http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/sgr_2000/OOpdfsFullReport.pdf.
78. Id. at 337-38.
79. Id. at 322 ("[N]umerous studies of cigarette smoking and other tobacco use ... account for
tobacco's addictive nature [and] find a strong inverse relationship between price and consumption.").
The presence of an inverse relationship between smoking and the price of cigarettes, however, does not
support the argument that the continuation of smoking is purely a matter of free choice. Nicotine
addiction may also strongly influence behavior. Id. at 129.
80. Id. at 322 ("The demand for tobacco products is different from the demands of other consumer
goods because of the addictive drug (nicotine) found in these products.").
81. Id. at 337; AM. MED. ASS'N, TOBACCO TAx CHALLENGE: SMOKELESS STATES NATIONAL
TOBACCO

POLICY
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http://www.rwjf.org/newsroom/SLSTaxChallenge.pdf.
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(2003),

available

at
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exposure to, access to, advertising and promotion of or use of tobacco
products by individuals of any age, information reporting to the State, or
measures relating to fire safety standards for tobacco products. No
provision of this chapter shall limit or82otherwise affect any State, Tribal,
or local taxation of tobacco products.
Under section 917, states would be free to continue to pursue smoking bans
and increases in tobacco taxes, as well as other traditional tobacco control strategies
such as bans on self-service displays and vending machines, increasing the
minimum age sales laws, mandating reduced ignition propensity for cigarettes, and
more.
In addition, section 917 along with section 203, which governs state
regulation of cigarette advertising and promotion, would enhance state tobacco
control authority by allowing for some advertising and promotion-related
regulation.83 There is little doubt that stopping cigarette advertisements that are
targeted at children is an important governmental objective. Despite laws
prohibiting cigarettes sales to anyone less than eighteen years of age in most
85
states, 84 the vast majority of today's smokers continue to start in their mid-teens.
A substantial body of evidence points to tobacco advertising as a reason for this
trend 86 and justifies interventions focused on these new smokers who are perhaps
less addicted (and therefore more reachable) than smokers in their twenties and
thirties.
This early intervention strategy was at issue in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated zoning-like
restrictions on tobacco advertising. 87 The Massachusetts Attorney General
promulgated the restrictions in response to surveys that showed that tobacco
advertising was clustered around areas frequented by children. 88 The zoning-like

82. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(1) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
83. S. 625, § 917(a)(2)(B); H.R. 1108 § 917(a)(2)(B) (permitting states to regulate the advertising
of tobacco product use by individuals of any age); S. 625, § 203(c); H.R. 1108, § 203(c) (permitting
states to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on advertising).
84. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-07(b)(2) (West 2007) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco
products to a minor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1504 (West 2007) (prohibiting the sale of tobacco
products to persons under the age of eighteen).
85. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 562 (D.D.C. 2006).
86. In examining the industry's racketeering conduct, Judge Kessler found that "[cligarette
marketing, which includes both advertising and promotion, is designed to play a key role in the process
of recruiting young, new smokers by exposing young people to massive amounts of imagery associating
positive qualities with cigarette smoking." Id. at 565. in addition, since 1999, several state attorneys
general have brought enforcement initiatives and lawsuits to stop various cigarette manufacturers from
targeting their promotional activities against youth. ECKHART, supra note 30, at 5-6.
87. 533 U.S. 525, 551-56 (2001).
88. Id. at 533; Howard K. Koh et al., The First Decade of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control
Program, 120 PuB. HEALTH REPs. 482, 483 (2005).
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component of the law prohibited outdoor advertising of tobacco products on
billboards or in store-front windows around schools, playgrounds and other areas
frequented by children. 89 Within these zones, any in-store advertisements or any
part of an advertisement lower than five feet from the ground were also
prohibited. 90 The practical effect of the in-store restriction was to remove tobacco
advertising from the area around the cash register where all customers, including
children, would go to pay for their items.
The tobacco industry argued, inter alia, that the Federal Cigarette Labeling9 1
and Advertising Act (FCLAA) expressly preempts the advertising restrictions.
The statutory language states that FCLAA preempts any "requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health . . . with respect to the advertising and
promotion of . . . cigarettes ...... 92 The legislative history of FCLAA was
instructive for the Court. The Court found that "Congress not only enhanced its
scheme to warn the public about the hazards of smoking, but also sought to protect
the public, including youth, from being inundated with images of cigarette smoking
in advertising." 93 To support this conclusion, the Court pointed to the ban on
cigarette advertising on television and radio. 94 The Court held, inter alia, that the
Massachusetts regulations restricting outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising
were preempted by FCLAA.95
Sections 917 and 203 of the proposed legislation would essentially reverse
this decision. Section 917 states that the law will not preempt state regulation of the
advertising and promotion of cigarette advertising. 96 Section 203 provides a similar
non-preemption clause, but includes further specificity. It states that:
[T]he Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act... is amended..
• [so that it declares that] ... a State or locality may enact statutes and

89. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 534-35 (quoting 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.04(5)(a)-(b),
21.04(6) (2000)).
90. Id. at 535 (quoting 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.04(5))(a)-(b) (2000)).
91. Lorillard Tobacco Co., F. Supp. 2d at 127, 133-34 (finding that Massachusetts regulations
banning outdoor and ground-level tobacco advertising were not preempted by FCLAA, but that
regulations regarding outdoor displays were preempted by the Act), aff'd sub noma.Consol. Cigar Corp.
v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2000), and rev'd 218 F.3d 30, 53, 58 (holding that restrictions on
outdoor cigarette displays did not violate federal law, including FCLAA and the First Amendment),
rev'd sub nom. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 551 (holding that the Massachusetts regulations
governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising were preempted by FCLAA and regulations
banning outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco or cigars within 1,000 feet of a school or playground
violated the First Amendment), and affd 533 U.S. at 570 (holding that regulations requiring retailers to
store tobacco products behind their counters did not violate the First Amendment).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
93. LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 547-48.
94. Id. at 548.
95. Id. at 551.
96. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(2)(B)
(2007); H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(a)(2)(B) (2007).
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promulgate regulations, based on smoking and health, that take effect
after the effective date of the [Act], imposing specific bans or
restrictions on the time, place and manner, but not content, of the
advertising and promotion of any cigarettes.97
This statutory language would relax the preemptive scope of FCLAA and
allow Massachusetts and other states to pursue advertising restrictions designed to
protect children from cigarette marketing, subject to applicable First Amendment
restrictions.98 Under the proposed FDA legislation, only the actual content of the
advertising, including health warnings, would remain solely within the regulatory
jurisdiction of the FDA. 99
B.

Non-Preemption of Tobacco Litigation

The second area of tobacco control that is protected by anti-preemption
language in the proposed legislation is private litigation against the
manufacturers. 100 In addition to the traditional role of providing at least the
possibility of compensating the millions of potential victims of the industry,
tobacco litigation has under-girded much of tobacco control strategy primarily by
creating opportunities for intervention. As the news media headlines reported on
multi-million dollar jury verdicts, government officials and the public began to
appreciate that the tobacco industry had played an instrumental role in creating the
tobacco disease epidemic.10 1 Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the public
disclosure of court pleadings and internal industry documents discovered in
litigation further supported this role. 102 State law makers and advocates harnessed
this energy into support for new and tougher tobacco control laws. 0 3 This
advocacy continues to the present and is now supported by an enormous body of
peer-reviewed research literature devoted to examining millions of industry
documents and reporting on industry behavior. 104

97. S.625, § 203(c); H.R. 1108, § 203(c).
98. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 571 (discussing how the First Amendment constrains state
efforts to limit tobacco advertising).
99. S. 625, § 203(c); H.R. 1108, § 203(c).
100. S. 625, § 917(b); H.R. 1108, § 917(b).
101. See Millions Awarded to Three Sick Smokers; Damages Seen as Bad Sign for Tobacco, CHI.

Apr. 8, 2000, at N3; Morton Mintz, Jury Finds Tobacco Firm Shares Blame in Death; Liggett
Told to Pay $400,000 in Damages, WASH. POST, June 14, 1988, at Al.

TRIB.,

102. E.g., George J. Annas, Tobacco Litigation as Cancer Prevention: Dealing with the Devil, 336
NEW ENG. J. MED. 304, 304 (1997); Myron Levin, Key Smoker Death Trial Draws to Close; Jury is
First to See Company Documents, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1988, § 1, at 4.
103. See AM. NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 72 (surveying states and local
municipalities with tobacco control laws).
104. CARL DEAL & JOANNE DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY ET AL., THE CALA
FILES: THE SECRET CAMPAIGN BY BIG TOBACCO AND OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIES TO TAKE AWAY

YOUR RIGHTS 1 (2000).
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Not surprisingly, the proposed legislation seeks not to disrupt the role of
litigation in tobacco control. In particular, section 917(b) states: "No provision of
this chapter relating to a tobacco product shall be construed to modify or otherwise
affect any action or the liability of any person under the product liability law of any
State."' 05
The industry began facing waves of litigation starting in the early 1950s,
when individuals began filing lawsuits under theories of deceit,' 0 6 breach of express
and implied warranty, 10 7 and negligence.108 Plaintiffs later added claims of failure
to warn and strict liability.'0 9 In 1994, states started filing medical reimbursement
lawsuits against the industry, arguing that smoking rates, and consequently the state
Medicaid expenditures incurred in treating sick and dying smokers, would have
been much lower had cigarette manufacturers not obfuscated the truth about the
effects of smoking on health." 0 Most of these lawsuits were settled in 1998 under
the Master Settlement Agreement (four were settled earlier), although similar
medical reimbursement-type lawsuits are being pursued in other countries."'
From September 2004 to June 2005, the tobacco industry faced one of its
longest trials to date in the lawsuit brought by the United States Department of2
Justice, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)."1

The case involved "the exchange of millions of documents, the entry of more than
1,000 Orders, and a trial which lasted approximately nine months with 84 witnesses
testifying in open court." ' 1 3 Judge Kessler, in her final opinion, devotes 817 pages
of her opinion to the findings of facts."14 The findings detail her conclusions that
the industry has devised and executed a scheme to defraud the public with regard
to: the adverse health consequences of smoking;" l5 the addictive properties of

105. S. 625, § 917(b); H.R. 1108, § 917(b).
106. E.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1964); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170, 171, 174 (1st Cir. 1956).

107. E.g., Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1968), overruled on reh 'g by 409
F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 481 (3rd Cir.
1965).

108. E.g., Pritchard,350 F.2d at 481; Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th
Cir. 1963).
109. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984).
110. E.g., Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claims
for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 497, 501-06 (1997).
111. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATr'Ys GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT § 1 (1998)

[hereinafter

Master Settlement Agreement], available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf
(follow "Master Settlement Agreement" hyperlink); Richard A. Daynard, Tobacco Litigation: A MidCourse Review, 12 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 383, 383-85 (2001).

112. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
113. Id. at28.
114. Id. at 34-851.
115. Id. at 146-208. For decades, defendants have misleadingly "denied, distorted, and minimized
the serious and harmful health consequences of smoking [cigarettes] .... Id. at 146.
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nicotine; l l6 the manipulation of nicotine and nicotine delivery;' 1 7 the use of "light"
and "low tar" brand indicators;"H8 youth marketing;" 9 environmental tobacco
smoke;

20

and research suppression and document destruction.

12

1

Judge Kessler ordered several equitable remedies, including the mass
publication of corrective statements by the industry and prohibition on any future
use of product descriptors like "light" that imply a reduction in risk.122 Although
Judge Kessler stated that other specific remedial action requested by the
Department of Justice and a group of public health interveners "would certainly
serve the public interest," an interlocutory appellate ruling narrowing the scope of
available remedies constrained her from implementing them. 123 Nevertheless, an
ongoing appeal in this case, which has temporarily stayed all of the remedies, could
potentially relax the holding reached in the interlocutory appellate ruling and allow
the trial court to order the equitable remedies prohibited by the interlocutory
ruling. 124
The tobacco industry also continues to face the effects of a massive class
action lawsuit in Florida. Originally filed in 1994 on behalf of smokers in the
United States, class certification was upheld in 1996, after it was changed to
include only Florida residents who had smoked. 25 In early 2000, after the
conclusion of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that smoking caused

116. Id. at 208-308. Defendants knew about the seriousness of nicotine addiction for decades, but
"they have endeavored to keep the extensive research and data they had accumulated out of the public
domain and out of the hands of the public community by denying that such data existed, by refusing to
disclose it, and by shutting down or censoring laboratories and research projects which were
investigating the mechanisms of nicotine." Id. at 307.
117. Id. at 308-84. Defendants have falsely "denied that they manipulated the nicotine in cigarettes
so as to increase the addiction and dependence of smokers." Id. at 384.
118. Id. at 430-561. "Defendants have known for decades that there is no clear health benefit from
smoking low tar/low nicotine cigarettes as opposed to conventional full-flavor cigarettes .... Despite
this knowledge, Defendants extensively-and successfully-marketed and promoted their low tar/light
cigarettes as less harmful alternatives to full-flavor cigarettes." Id. at 560.
119. Id. at 561-692. Defendants deliberately marketed cigarettes to youth under the age of twentyone in order to recruit replacement smokers as a way to ensure a positive economic future for the
tobacco industry. Id. at 561.
120. Id. at 692-839. The court concluded that the defendants acknowledged that environmental
tobacco smoke is hazardous to nonsmokers, but publicly denied this knowledge. Id. at 692.
121. Id. at 866-67 (finding that, over the past fifty years, the defendants have suppressed, concealed,
and destroyed information about smoking to prevent the public from leaming about the adverse health
consequences of smoking, the addictive qualities of nicotine, and to avoid litigation liability for smoking
and health related claims).
122. Id. at 924-25, 928.
123. Id. at 33, 932 n.91.
124. Brief of Amici Curiae The American Medical Ass'n & Others in Support of the Plaintiff,
United States & Tobacco-Free Kids Action Fund v. Philip Morris, No. 06-5267 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26,
2007).
125. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Barry Meier,
Huge Awardfor Smokers is Voided by Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A20.
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many diseases including cancers, lung and heart diseases; that nicotine is addictive;
and that the tobacco industry defendants had committed fraud and
misrepresentation, conspiracy to commit concealment, conspiracy to misrepresent,
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of express and
implied warranties.1 6 During the first phase of the trial, the jury found that both
compensatory and punitive damages could be awarded to the plaintiffs and returned
a few months later to consider the amount of damages.1 2 7 In 2000, the jury found
the defendant tobacco companies liable for the injuries to all three representative
class members and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $12.7
million.' 28 The jury then awarded the class $145 billion, the largest punitive
129
damages award ever issued.
In 2006, on appeal, the Florida Supreme Court modified the compensatory
damage awards and struck down the punitive damages award. '" The Court held
instead that the trial's first phase findings of industry liability would have res
judicata effect for the class for a period of one year.' 31 The members of the class
may now proceed individually in what amounts to a strict liability claim where
each claimant need only show that his or her injuries are among the many known
cigarette-caused diseases; they may also make use of some of the jury's intentional
tort findings to seek punitive damages.' 32 Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court,
the highest court in Massachusetts, recently ruled that an individual plaintiff could
also proceed against a cigarette manufacturer on a strict liability basis where the
33
plaintiff claimed a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 1
The tobacco industry also faces consumer fraud class actions arising from its
marketing of "light" cigarettes. These lawsuits allege that manufacturers have
misled consumers by marketing "light" and "low tar" cigarettes as having less tar
and nicotine than other brands, even though they knew the actual exposure levels

126. See Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273, 2000 WL 33534572, at *1-5, *16 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), rev'd sub noma.Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003), approvedin part, quashed in part, 945 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2006).

127. Meier, supra note 125 (documenting jurors' decision to award both compensatory and punitive
damages at end of the first phase of trial); Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record
Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at AI (documenting jurors' decision that tobacco industry to pay
$144.8 billion in punitive damages to Florida smokers during the next phase).
128. Meier, supranote 125.
129. Id.
130. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254-56 (Fla. 2006).
131. Id. at 1276-77.
132. See id. at 1277 ("Individual plaintiffs within the class will be permitted to proceed individually
with the findings set forth above given res judicata effect in any subsequent trial between individual
class members and the defendants, provided such action is filed within one year of the mandate in this
case.").
133. Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 321-22 (Mass. 2006) (stating that under
Massachusetts law, actions for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability are equivalent to strict
liability).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 11:57

were no different.' 34 While most smokers and potential smokers believe that "light"
cigarettes are less hazardous to their health than other brands,' 35 consensus in the
medical and public health community is that there is no difference.' 36 Internal
13 7
documents from tobacco companies show that they long believed the same thing!
Those who smoked (and continue to smoke) "light" cigarettes, reasonably believing
they were being exposed to less tar or nicotine, are seeking court-ordered restitution
of the money fraudulently obtained from them by the tobacco companies. 138
Because these claims are typically brought under state Unfair Trade and Deceptive
Business Practice statutes, which allow for treble139
damages, plaintiffs are able to ask
for three times the value of their financial losses.
Section 917(b) of the proposed legislation would clearly preclude the
potential for legal preemption of tobacco litigation. It states that nothing in the
FDA legislation is to "affect any action or the liability of any person under the
product liability law of any State."' 140 Nevertheless, in litigation, tobacco industry
defendants would probably seek to exploit the fact that they are regulated by the
FDA and argue to judges and juries that non-compensatory damages are not
warranted. Cigarette manufacturers have similarly used the 1998 Multi-State
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to try to immunize themselves from punitive
damages and equitable remedies." 4 The MSA resolved lawsuits brought by fortysix states against the industry in the mid-1990s to primarily recover tobacco-related
Medicaid expenditures incurred as a result of the industry misleading the public
42
and obfuscating the health effects of their products.1

134. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 33 (I11.2005); Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
850 N.E.2d 31, 32-33 (Ohio 2006). See also Sherri Day, Philip Morris is Convicted of Fraud in
Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at A6; David C. Johnston & Melanie Warner, Tobacco Makers
Lose Key Ruling on Latest Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at Al.
135. Lynn T. Kozlowski & Janine L. Pillitteri, Beliefs About "Light" and "Ultra Light" Cigarettes
and Efforts to Change Those Beliefs: An Overview of Early Efforts and Published Research, 10

TOBACCO CONTROL (SuPP.), at i12, i 13 (2001).
136. E.g., Nat'l Cancer Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, Preface to SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL
MONOGRAPH 13, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CIGARETTES WITH LOW MACHINE-MEASURED

YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE, at i, ii (Donald R. Shopland et al. eds., 2001).
137. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also Editorial, Low-Tar Duplicity, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 200 1, at A18.
138. Price v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 00-L-I 12, 2003 WL 22597608, at *14 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2003);
Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ohio 2006).
139. E.g., Marrone, 850 N.E.2d at 39-40 (Grady, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (discussing
the damages provision in the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act).
140. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 917(b) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(b) (2007).
141. E.g., Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), approved in
part, quashedin part, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
142. John M. Broder, Cigarette Makers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb Lawsuits and Curtail
Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al; Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 111, at 119-52.
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The MSA was not intended to settle lawsuits brought by individuals or classes
of individuals with potential claims against the tobacco industry. In early settlement
talks prior to consideration of the MSA, the parties had considered a much more
expansive settlement essentially designed, in part, to settle all actual and potential
litigation.' 43 The prospect of immunizing the industry in this manner became so
divisive that the proposed settlement was dropped, allowing the individuals with
144
potential claims to bring suit either individually or in the form of class actions.
Indeed, by the words of the MSA itself, these private lawsuits would appear to be
protected. The MSA states "[n]either this Agreement nor any public discussions...
with respect to this Agreement shall be ... offered or received in evidence in any
action or proceeding for any purpose other than in an action or proceeding arising
under or relating to this Agreement."' 4 5 Minnesota, Florida, and Texas, which
settled with the cigarette industry before the Agreement, each included effectively
the same language in its agreement. 146
This restriction on using the MSA in litigation, which is not related to the
enforcement of the MSA, has not dissuaded the industry. In the massive tobacco
class action lawsuit in Florida, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds, all of the leading cigarette
manufacturers argued successfully before the state intermediate appellate court that
the MSA prohibited the jury's punitive damage award. 147 In 2000, the jury awarded
approximately $145 billion in punitive damages. 148 Until the jury awarded punitive
damages, the trial judge had barred the industry from admitting the MSA into
evidence, but on appeal, the defendants successfully argued that Florida's version
of the MSA punished them enough and that there was no need for further
punishment for the harm caused to individual litigants. 49 The appeals court agreed,

143. Michael Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, The "Global Settlement" with the Tobacco Industry: 6
Years Later, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 218, 218, 221-22 (2004).

144. Seeid. at218.
145. See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 111, § XVIII (f), at 106 (including a provision
that protects any statements made during the negotiation of the MSA from being admitted into evidence
in future litigation).
146. Settlement Agreement, Florida v. Am. Tobacco Co, Civ. Action No. 95-1466 AH, at § VI, C
(Fla. Cir. Aug. 25, 1997), available at http://stic.neu.edu/F/flsettle.htm; Settlement Agreement,
Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., Civ. Case No. CI-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998), available at
http://stic.neu.edu/MN/settlement.htm; Settlement Agreement, Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5-96CV91, at 22 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1998), availableat http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/Texas-settlement.htm.
147. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 468-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the
lower court erred in instructing the jury that the Florida Settlement Agreement (FSA) and the MSA did
not constitute punishment of or deterrence to the defendants and "[t]his error precluded the defendants
from presenting crucial mitigation evidence in the form of the FSA and MSA to support the argument
that they had already received heavy financial obligations and binding deterrent measures for precisely
the same conduct [as alleged by the plaintiffs in this case]"), approved in part,quashed in part,945 So.
2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
148. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572, at *12 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 6, 2000).
149. Liggett Group Inc., 853 So. 2d at 468-70.
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going so far as to state that Florida's MSA-like agreement negated any punitive
damage claims. 150 The Florida Supreme Court later reversed this ruling but struck
down the punitive damage award on other grounds. 151
If the FDA legislation 152 were enacted, the tobacco industry would very likely
make arguments similar to those in Engle,153 as the existence of federal oversight
would appear to limit the potential for malfeasance. In many lawsuits, this
argument is moot. For example, in the "light" cigarette litigation, the plaintiffs are
seeking to collect money spent for a product that basically does not deliver on the
claim that "light" cigarettes expose smokers to less tar and nicotine. 154 A defendant
tobacco manufacturer might argue that it has changed and stopped its wrongdoing,
albeit involuntarily in the case of enhanced regulatory oversight, but this stance is
irrelevant to "light" cigarette litigation. The obligation of the defendant
manufacturer to, in essence, refund the money spent on "light" cigarettes remains
valid. This same rationale would hold true for other consumer protection-based
class actions.
Another potential argument likely to be made by the tobacco industry is that
the industry will be adequately fenced in by FDA oversight and that the public
therefore does not need further protection from the industry through additional
court remedies. This argument appears to fall short of the mark with regard to
punitive damages. This position ignores the fact that tobacco industry defendants
may still engage in wrongful conduct, perhaps the same type of conduct at issue in
current trials. This was the key conclusion in the federal government's successful
RICO case against the industry. 155 Judge Kessler rejected the contention that the
defendants had changed either voluntarily or because of the MSA, pointing to the
flagrant misconduct that continued through the trial. 156 She concluded that the
industry conduct would very likely continue, even within the existing tobacco
57
control laws. 1
The long-held understanding with respect to FDA oversight is that state
common law tort claims create a separate and important layer of public health
protection and offer a means for compensating individuals when FDA oversight

150. Id.
151. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the class should
be decertified because individual causation and apportionment of fault among the defendants were
highly individualized and vacating the punitive damages award after finding the award excessive as a
matter of law).
152. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 917(b) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(b) (2007).
153. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
154. Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ohio 2006).
155. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d. 1,848, 911-15 (D.D.C. 2006).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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proves insufficient.1 58 Although the FDA asserted in 2002 that its oversight is
preemptive, the majority of courts hearing products liability cases involving drugs
approved by the FDA have disagreed with this new position and allowed the cases
to go forward.1 59 The anti-preemption language in section 917(b) would help ensure
that tobacco litigation would continue to exert each state's unique level
of public
60
health protection above and beyond that afforded by FDA oversight.'
Despite the intent not to alter the course of tobacco litigation, the question
remains whether the FDA legislation could do more and revive the state law claims
that were barred by the enactment of FCLAA. Like many other tobacco control
strategies, tobacco litigation itself is constrained by preemption. Such preemption
began in 1992, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 161 In Cipollone, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's ruling that FCLAA preempted
failure-to-warn state claims, based on the conclusion that Congress wanted only
one set of cigarette health warnings, those required by FCLAA. 62 Proof in state
court that a manufacturer had failed to warn its customers of the dangers of
smoking, according to the Court, would effectively63 mandate more warning
requirements and, thus, must not be allowed to happen.'
Since Cipollone, cigarette manufacturers have used FCLAA preemption to
chip away at other state law claims used in tobacco litigation. For example, in a
more recent case, Good v. Altria Group, Inc., the manufacturer argued that FCLAA
preempted the plaintiffs claims that the marketing of light cigarettes violated the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Statute. 64 While the trial court agreed with this
position, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did not. 165 The
Court of Appeals found that the claim alleged "fraudulent misrepresentations in
derogation of 'a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive,"' as opposed to
a specific claim regarding the advertising and promotion of cigarettes, of the type
66
that FCLAA arguably preempt.'

158. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48
B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1094-99 (2007).
159. Id.
160. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 11 0th Cong. § 917(b) (2007);
H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. § 917(b) (2007).
161. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
162. See id at 505, 515-17, 524-25 (1992) (finding that the 1969 amendments to FCLAA preempt
state law claims challenging the adequacy of cigarette warnings on labels or in advertising), aff'g in part,
rev'g in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
163. See id. at 524-25 (holding that FCLAA preempted state failure-to-warn claims that required a
showing that a cigarette manufacturer's "advertising or promotions should have included additional, or
more clearly stated warnings").
164. 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133, 144-45 (D. Me. 2006), vacated, 501 F.3d 29, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2007),
cert. granted 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008).
165. Id. at 153; Good, 501 F.3d at 58.
166. Good, 501 F. 3d at 42 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 11:57

A final determination will come from the United States Supreme Court, which
accepted the manufacturer's petition for certiorari. 67 The Court's decision will
have a dramatic impact on tobacco litigation. Light cigarette lawsuits have been
filed under most states' unfair and deceptive trade statutes and several are awaiting
68
trial. 1
The FDA legislation could be amended to clarify the boundary for the
preemption of tobacco litigation or to simply remove preemption. However, the
FDA legislation, in its current form, does neither.
C. Preemption of Mandated Reductions in Smoke Constituent Emissions
The final area of tobacco control in which state law measures would be
affected by the proposed legislation is that of direct product regulation. As
indicated in Part I of this Article, creating a framework for mandating reductions in
harmful constituents in tobacco smoke is a major focus of the FDA reauthorization.
Section 917(a)(2) states, in relevant part, that:
(A) IN GENERAL.-No State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a tobacco product any
requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
under the provisions of this chapter relating to tobacco product
standards, premarket approval, adulteration, misbranding, labeling,
registration, good manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco
products.
(B) EXCEPTION.-Subparagraph (A) does not apply to requirements
relating to the sale, distribution, possession, information reporting to the
State, exposure to, access to, the advertising and promotion of, or use of,
tobacco products by individuals of any age, or relating to fire safety
standards for tobacco products. 169
The terms included in subsection (A) above, including "adulteration,"
"misbranding," and so on, are all terms of art that refer to an FDA-regulated
product that is not in compliance. 170 Although states would be allowed to ban
cigarettes, the language in section 917(a)(2), discussed above, would preempt states
from establishing laws that similarly mandate changes in product design.
Historically speaking, this preemptive language preempts what states could do if
they wanted to exercise their police power authority to mandate cigarette design
167. Good, 128 S. Ct. 1119(2008).
168. See id.; ED SWEDA, ET AL., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, LIGHT CIGARETTE
LAWSUITS
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2007,

at

2-9

(2007),

available

at

http://www.tobaccolawcenter.org/resources/Lightcigarettes.pdf.
169. S. 625, § 917(a)(2)(A)-(B); H.R. 1108, § 917(a)(2)(A)-(B).
170. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352 (2000) (defining "adulterated" and "misbranded" drugs and
devices).
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changes. 17 1 But, at least thus far, states have not sought to exercise this power,
except with reference to fire safety standards.' 72 No state limits the emission of
toxic constituents in tobacco smoke. The only real glimpse of what this type of
performance standard might look like comes from the recent increase in reduced
ignition propensity (RIP) cigarette laws, which are expressly excluded from the
73
preemption language. 1
In June 2004, a New York state law mandating RIP standards for cigarettes
went into effect. 1 74 Under this law, manufacturers are responsible for ensuring
compliance by using a testing protocol from the New York Office of Fire
Prevention and Control,' 75 which essentially requires that each cigarette brand selfextinguish within a certain amount of time under controlled conditions. 176 Once a
brand has passed, the manufacturer must provide New York officials with a written
certification to that effect and place a mark on the cigarette packaging to indicate
compliance. 177 Retesting and certification is required every three years. 178 Since
adoption by New York, twenty-one other states have adopted RIP laws,' 79 using the
0
New York standard.18
States' experiences with RIP laws would appear to demonstrate one way in
which states could-absent federal preemption-establish performance standards
that are geared towards reducing nicotine delivery or toxic constituents in tobacco
smoke. Each state could enforce a common set of performance standards using the
same testing protocol. Under RIP laws, manufacturers would be free to compete
with each other and adopt whatever technological means they see fit, as long as the
cigarette passes the testing protocol. Even the variation in experiences and research
among the participating states would perhaps inform improvements to the
performance standards. Alternatively, states could adopt unique nicotine or toxic

171. State police power would appear to include the ability to regulate or ban a product that is
harmful to its citizenry. Public health protection is primarily a function of state police power. James G.
Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modem Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New
Federalismand Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 93, 94 (1997).
172. Maine and Vermont, for example, regulate reduced ignition propensity cigarettes in fire safety
statutes. 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-E (Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2757 (Supp.
2007).
173. S. 625, § 917(a)(2)(B); H.R. 1108, § 917(a)(2)(B).
174. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 156-c(2)(a)(l)-(2) (McKinney 2006).
175. Id. § 156-c(2)(a)(2).
176. Id. § 156-c(2)(a)(1); accord HILLEL R. ALPERT, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM,
REGULATING
CIGARETTES
FOR
FIRE
SAFETY
1,
2
(2007),
available
at
http://tclconline.org/documents/firesafecigarettes.pdf.
177. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 19, §§ 429.6,429.8 (2006).
178. Id. § 429.6(c).
179. Coal. for Fire-Safe Cigarettes, Model Legislation, http://www.firesafecigarettes.org (follow
"Legislative Updates" hyperlink; then follow "Adoptions" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
180. Coal. for Fire-Safe Cigarettes, supra note 179 (follow "Model Legislation" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 17, 2008).
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performance standards, thereby learning even more from the different approaches
81
for reducing cigarette-caused harm. 1
Whether the experience with RIP laws is predictive of what could or would
occur is debatable. What we know, however, is that currently no state directly
regulates cigarette product design and marketing outside the RIP context. 182
Concern about the preventive effects of section 917(a)(2) of the FDA legislation
would only be justified under a prediction that states would take effective action
along these lines and that the FDA would not.
CONCLUSION

Like many grass roots movements, tobacco control's asymmetrical approach
has worked because it does not directly challenge political dominance entrenched at
the federal level. Instead, tobacco control started at the local level, building
political and legal capacity until enough leverage existed to push through initiatives
at the state level. 183 Many local communities and states involved in this effort tried
different approaches and evaluated those approaches until core strategies
developed: banning smoking in public places, increasing tobacco taxes, and
more.1 84 Enough momentum may now exist to push through an initiative at the
federal level-FDA oversight over tobacco products. At this writing, the FDA
legislation has 222 cosponsors out of 435 members in the House of
Representatives, 85 and 55 cosponsors out of 100 members of the Senate.' 86 On
April 2, 2008, the version of the FDA legislation in the House of Representatives

181. Under certain circumstances, the Commerce Clause may be used to block the exertion of such
authority even in the absence of federal legislation. It might well form the basis of a legal challenge by
tobacco interests if states were to set performance standards that vary from state to state. See Wendy E.
Parmet & Christopher Banthin, Public Health Protection and the Commerce Clause: Controlling
Tobacco in the Internet Age, 35 N.M. L. REv. 81, 83 (2005) ("Although courts traditionally assert that
states have the power to protect public health,... the combination of recent doctrinal developments and
the increasingly multi-state and even international nature of public health threats and commerce have
made it more and more difficult for state public health laws to survive challenges brought under the
dormant Commerce Clause.").
182. The only exception is a limited set of youth marketing restrictions found in the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, § HI (a) at 14. Several states are
currently prosecuting R.J. Reynolds under the Agreement for alleged misrepresentations in the
marketing of one of its so-called reduced exposure cigarette brands. See Petition for Contempt &
Complaint at 5, Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 744 CnC & S-816-98 (Vt. Super. Ct. July
26,
2005),
available
at
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/ 125510625_VermontsComplaint and Petition.pdf.
183. See supra notes 71-77, 102-04 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
185. See sources cited supranote 1.
186. Id.
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was approved by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.18
88
legislation must still go to the House of Representatives for consideration.'

7

The

Apart from the content of the legislation itself, which appears to be very
effective, having a tobacco control policy at the federal level provides some
important strategic advantages. First, it creates a regulatory framework to oversee
the tobacco industry's efforts to re-normalize at least some types of tobacco use by
claiming to reduce exposure to tobacco toxins.' 8 9 Second, it affords states new
opportunities for expanding their tobacco control policies.' 90 Notably, states will be
in a better legal position to prohibit cigarette advertising near schools, playgrounds
and other areas where children congregate. Third, the vast resources and expertise
of the FDA could make it an important partner in future tobacco control efforts, not
only for local communities and states, but also for tobacco control efforts in other
countries.
Nevertheless, the proposed oversight would be incapable of replacing state
tobacco control policies, or of effectively drawing upon the public health
practitioners and advocates who run state and local tobacco control programs.
Accordingly, express anti-preemption language is essential. In its current form, the
proposed FDA legislation includes such language and preserves state tobacco
control policies, including tobacco litigation.g1 In shepherding the proposed FDA
legislation through Congress, strong anti-preemption language must continue to be
a priority.
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Landmark Tobacco Bill (Apr. 2,2008), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press 110/1 10nr244.shtml.
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189. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 911 (2007); H.R.
1108, 110th Cong. § 911 (2007).
190. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.

191. S. 625,§917; H.R. 1108,§ 917.

